Abstract -One of the best ways to defend a especially helpful to defenders. It could convince computer system is to make attackers think it is not attackers to go away because the system appears worth attacking. Deception or inconsistency during invulnerable to the exploits that they know; it could attacker reconnaissance can be an effective way to make the system look very unreliable by deliberate encourage this. We provide some theory of its delays and error messages; or it could make the system advantages and present some data from a honeypot look like a honeypot since attackers do not like that suggests ways it could be fruitfully employed. We honeypots. We can try out reconnaissance-phase then report on experiments that manipulatedpackets of deceptions in honeypots and see how attackers respond attackers of a honeypot using Snort Inline. Results )f~~~~~ãs a kind of "experimental information assurance".
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show that attackers definitely responded to deceptive manipulations, although not all the responses helped II. BACKGROUND defenders. We conclude with some preliminary results on analysis of "last packets" of a session which indicate more precisely what clues turn attackers Deception is frequently used in cyber-attacks, most away.
commonly as identity deception and concealment.
Defensive deception most commonly appears in Index terms -deception, computers, reconnaissance, cyberspace in honeypots, machines deliberately honeypot, packets, cost, networks designed to be attack targets [3] . While honeypots do not necessarily use deception, they are more effective if they do because attackers know honeypots collect I. INTRODUCTION their attack methods and are unlikely to be fully exploitable [4] . radiation" of the Internet [8] . New statistical * Cc is the average cost perceived by the techniques are emerging for studying it of which we attacker to subsequently compromise a randomly can take advantage of [9, 10, 11] .
chosen system. We have been running a honeypot for over a year * C is the cost of testingthe victim machine through a digital subscriber line to an Internet service 0tt provider with no association with our school. The to determine its properties.
honeypot is kept up-to-date with operating-system * p5 is the prior probability that a random patches so we see few break-ins but many machine is confirmed as a honeypot by the test.
reconnaissances. Figure 1 Figure 3 shows the distribution of the unclustered drop and modify packets. Precedents are ther work of count of attacks as a function of hour of the day in [12] and [13] Point, NY 20-22 June 2007 collected 36 hours of intrusion data in each the same time, the intrusion variety decreases but at a of several runs and calculated the mean and slower rate. This suggests that packet manipulations standard deviation of its statistics.
can deal with intrusion types that patched systems * For Experiment 2, we did the same runs cannot handle. using Windows with the most recent Figure 5 shows how the type of attacks changed service packs and patches.
over the experiments. Attacks involving NETBIOS * For Experiment 3, we let the setup stabilize overflows and SHELLCODE NOPs decreased, but over a period of one week after it was first ICMP PING and MS-SQL attempted overflows put online, and then measured traffic.
increased. It appears we are forcing attackers to use * For Experiment 4, we dropped ICMP less-effective alternate methods, though they are still traffic going to and coming from our trying. honeynet.
We also examined the effects of deception in the * For Experiment 5, we used the rules from file-transfer utility FTP on the duration of login attacks Experiment 4 but added rules to replace attempts. We charted the durations of FTP intrusions certain keywords in protocol messages with by eight intruder IP addresses ( Figure 6 ). This first deceptive ones as described above. As a shown with the dotted pattern fill indicates a typical subexperiment, we also examined the FTP intrusion on an Experiment 3 system; the effects of deceptive responses on fileremaining seven occurred on an Experiment 5 system. transfer attacks.
Six out of these seven intrusions ended within two We measured Snort alert counts separately for hours; one where our deception was not successful in each experiment.
We omitted "Destination dissuading the intrusion ended just less than five hours. Unreachable", "Port Unreachable", and "ICMP This latter attack suggests an intruder who uses redirect" alerts because they concerned reconnaissance automated tools to scan and conduct attacks; they alone; we omitted login failure alerts because they had probably let the tool run without much monitoring and high numbers whose counts were rather arbitrary, return some five hours later to check on their yield. In apparent due to automated password-guessing tools.
none of these attempts did the intruder learn anything The omitted intrusion types accounted for 98.7% of the about the password. For instance, the first FTP raw counts for one run in Experiment 1 where the intrusion unsuccessfully tried about three hours of honeypot was compromised and used by the successful password combinations. intruder to probe other networks.
Our results show that intruders are definitely VI. LAST-PACKET ANALYSIS affected by our unexpected responses to their exploits Currently we are investigating further what clues ( Figure 4 ). We plot intrusion counts (left scale) and attackers are responding to by analyzing the last few variety or number of distinct alerts (right scale) across packets sent during a session with an attacker. The the experiments ("Level 0 (unpatched)" is Experiment idea is that what the attacker saw just before they went 1, "Level 0 (patched)" is Experiment 2, etc.) away could be something that encouraged them to go Experiment 3 shows the best job in keeping the away, and thus a good basis for a deception. This intrusion counts at a stable low. In Experiments 4 and approach is similar to that of early detection of worms 5, the intrusion count rises although not as much in the from small clues [14] 
